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LIMITS OF ASSENT IN CONSUMER
CONTRACTS: A (REGULATORY) VIEW
FROM THE SOUTH
Nicolds Rojas Covarrubias*

ABSTRACT
The Restatement of the Law Consumer Contractsproject
has proved to be controversial. The currentpublished draft of the
Restatement diminishes the role of assent as a fundamental element to determine the content of an agreement, limiting its influence to the "core deal terms" and accepting thatpropernotice and
reasonable opportunityto review proposedstandardterms (preor

post transaction)is enough to adopt them as part of the contract.
This has been questioned from empiricaland normative perspectives, being qualifiedas detrimental to consumers' rights. In fact,
the draftproposalactuallyincursin the same defect that it is trying
to solve: ifit is not plausible to expect that consumersread and take
informed account of the contracts'provisions (and to expect a
meaningfulassent), it is difficult to see how propernotice and reasonable opportunity to review standardterms pre orpost transac-

tion would provide betterprotection to consumers. However, the
critiquedoes not solve the problem. Meaningfulassent is a chimera
and unconscionabilityby itself is not a powerful enough remedy,
because ex post enforcement face severe limitations.

*Assistant professor, Private Law, Universidad de Chile School of Law, L.L.M.
Columbia University (2006), Ph.D. candidate, Universidad de Chile School of
Law, nrojas@derecho.uchile.cl. I would like to thank Cristiin Banfi, Maria Agnes Salah and Viviana Diaz for their comments. A draft of this paper was presented at the Second Annual Consumer Law Scholars Conference at Berkeley
Law School, March 5-6, 2020. This paper is part of my doctoral studies, financed
by ANID/Doctorado Nacional/2017-21171928.
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The draft proposalprovides a stark contrast with the state
of consumer protection law in civil law countries' In the latter,
though assent is still essential to enter into a contract, there have
been several regulatoryefforts to address the problems caused by
the massive andanonymous characterof consumer contracts, from
ex ante regulation to attempts to improve the fairness control of
standardterms. As I will argue, a regulatoryapproach that abandon the limitations of contract law doctrines, such as assent and
business' autonomy to design the terms and conditions of consumer contracts seems to be better suited to address a form of relationshipthat does not conform to the basic structure of a private
law contract.

1Jacobien Rutgers, Business First. A Comment on the Adoption of
Standard Terms under the American Restatement of the Law Consumer
Contractsfrom a European Union Perspective, 15 EUR. REV. CONTRACT LAW
2,146 (2019).
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INTRODUCTION

The Restatement of the Law Consumer Contracts project
has proved to be controversial. The current published draft of the
Restatement 2 (hereinafter, the "Draft Restatement") diminishes the
role of assent as a fundamental element to determine the content
of an agreement, limiting its influence to the "core deal terms" and
accepting that proper notice and reasonable opportunity to review
proposed standard terms (pre or post transaction) is enough to

adopt them as part of the contract. This has been questioned from
an empirical' and normative perspective, being qualified as a "dagger through consumers' rights 4".
In fact, the draft proposal actually incurs in the same defect
that it is trying to solve: if it is not plausible to expect that consumers read and take informed account of the contracts' provisions
(and to expect a meaningful assent from them), it is difficult to see
how proper notice and reasonable opportunity to review standard
terms pre or post transaction would provide better protection to
consumers. However, mere criticism does not solve the problem.
Meaningful assent is a chimera and unconscionability by itself is
not a powerful enough remedy, as expost enforcement face severe
limitations.

This article is divided in three parts. Part I examines the
notion of assent in the Draft Restatement, according to its premises
and raise some objections to the road taken from a civil law perspective. Part II refers to the answers given by European and Chilean Law to problems related to unfair terms. Part III argues that

private law is not well equipped to deal with consumer contracts
and that beyond the traditional private law rules and remedies, the

2

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONSUMER CONTRACTS
(AM. LAW INST.,

Tentative Draft, 2019).
' Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of
Consumer ContractLaw, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 46 (2019).; see also Adam J.
Levitin et al., The Faulty Foundationof the DraftRestatement of Consumer
Contracts,36 YALE J. ON REG. 447 (2019).
4 Melvin Eisenberg, The ProposedRestatement of Consumer Contracts, if
Adopted, Would Drive a Dagger Through Consumers' Rights, YALE J. ON
REG., Notice & Comment, Symposium on the Draft Restatement of the Law of
http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-proposed-restatement-ofConsumer Contracts,
consumer-contracts-if-adopted-would-drive-a-dagger-through-consumersrights-by-melvin-eisenberg/ (March 20, 2019).
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real answers lies in a regulatory view of consumer contracts. The
article ends with a short conclusion.

I.

ASSENT IN THE DRAFT RESTATEMENT OF

CONSUMER CONTRACTS
According to the Reporters' Introduction to the Draft Restatement, "[c]onsumer contracts present a fundamental challenge
to the law of contracts, arising from the asymmetry in information,

sophistication, and stakes between the parties to these contracts5 ".
These asymmetries generate a significant disturbance in the way
of thinking of private law. Private law has long regarded parties as
formally equal in power and rights, so that no one is able to command the other, and, consequently, both are able to stand their
ground during negotiations 6

The Reporters explains that two main techniques are used
for dealing with these challenges: the doctrine of mutual assent and
establishing a set of mandatory restrictions over the substance of
the deal' I will argue that both techniques have a common base in
the way private law understands assent, and that the approach of
the Draft Restatement is flawed and leaves consumers worse-off
than other alternatives.
Assent has been regarded as a fundamental concept in private law, both in common and civil law traditions. Since Gaius, the
law of obligations is divided between ex contractu and ex delictod,
which seems to be related to the Aristotelian division between voluntary and involuntary transactions9 Assent is the foundation
where the binding nature of contract is built, and the question of
5

RESTATEMENT

OF THE

LAW

CONSUMER

CONTRACTS,

Reporters'

Introduction, (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft, 2019).
6 This is a simplification. Private law recognizes limitations
to private autonomy in the civil law tradition under the principle of good faith; in the common law, there have been significant developments that have altered the classic
premises, such as undue influence, duress and fiduciary duties. See ENRIQUE
BARROS, LA DOCTRINA DE LA FUERZA EN EL MARCO DE LA REVISION
CONTEMPORANEA

DE

LA

DOCTRINA

VOLUNTARISTA

DEL

CONTRATO,

ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO CIVIL XI 469 (Thomson Reuters, 2016).
1 RESTATEMENT

OF THE

LAW

CONSUMER

CONTRACTS,

Reporters'

Introduction, 1-2 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft, 2019).
8 Gaius,
Instituciones, § 88, TEXTOS DE DERECHO ROMANO (Rafael
Domingo, ed., 2002).
9 ARISTOTLES, ETICA NICOMAQUEA, 1131a1, 31b25, 31b31 (2008).
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consent is crucial then to determine if an obligation exists or not 0
However, after decades of standard form contracts, there is dissent
regarding the more basic question of what is assent"
The Draft Restatement has an answer for that question, yet
it is unfocused. It seems that in the text, assent is basically equated
to will, where the consumer makes a deliberate decision to enter
into a contract, including all its terms and conditions, based on the
information she has at hand. This idea, in turn, justifies the proliferation of disclosure mandates in several types of consumers'
transactions, with questionable results

2

As the concept of assent is

,

limited to that idea, the Reporters consider that mandatory restrictions on the content of a contract are a form of expost judicial
scrutiny of contract terms. The Draft Restatement adds that even
in the absence of deliberate consent by the consumer to all terms
and conditions of standard form agreements, the courts "endorse
and enforce" those contracts, provided some requirements.
The Reporters affirm that "[t]he goal of these court-developed requirements is to afford consumers a meaningful opportunity to review the terms and to avoid the transaction 3 ". This approach is based on Llewellyn's ideas of contract and assent 4
developed in an era where standard form contracts were not as
prevalent as today, and, more important, there was no online commerce. Therefore, there are significant gaps in the regulation that
are not addressed in the Draft Restatement, although the Reporters acknowledge the existence of the problem.
The Draft Restatement divides consumer assent in two

parts. The first one refers to the "core terms" of the transaction,
mainly, the good that the consumer is acquiring, and its price. We
could also include here the warranties offered by the vendor. We
expect meaningful consent of the consumer regarding the core
terms (i.e., the traditional assent doctrine), but standard terms follow different rules in order to become part of the contract. Section
§2 (a) of the Draft Restatement states that a standard term is
10

JACK BEATSON AND DANIEL FRIEDMANN, GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN

CONTRACT LAW 8 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995).
" PETER ALCES, COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN

PERSPECTIVES 59 (Larry A. Dimatteo & Martin Hogg eds., 2016).
12 Omri Ben-Shahar
& Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Discourse, 3 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 665, 665, 750 (2010-11).
13 RESTATEMENT

OF THE LAW

CONSUMER CONTRACTS,

Introduction, 2 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 2019).
14 Id at 5.
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adopted as part of a consumer contract if the consumer manifests
assent to the transaction after receiving: (1) a reasonable notice of
the term and of the intent to include the term as part of the consumer contract, and (2) a reasonable opportunity to review the
term.

Another relevant aspect is the definition of the moment in
which the contract is formed. As per traditional contract doctrine,
a contract exists when mutual assent is reached, that is, when the
meeting of the minds occurs 5 But the Draft Restatement recognized that it does not matter if the standard terms -especially on
online transactions- are presented to the consumer before or after
the decision to enter the transaction1 6 At least from the perspective
of civil law doctrine, this is a fundamental change to the rules of
contract formation. Nonetheless, the fact that it is considered a
change speaks of how outdated contract doctrine is when it comes
to contract formation in the consumer space.
Although the proposed division of assent is not unreasonable, the solution proposed is incoherent. Consumers in a large percentage do not read or review the terms and conditions of their
contracts. This is recognized by the same Reporters. Professor Ben-

Shahar has authored a well-known book on the ineffectiveness of
mandated disclosures", and professor Marotta-Wurgler has written extensively on the matter1 8 So, the question is, why the Draft
Restatement insists that by way of giving "reasonable notice" and
"reasonable opportunity" to consumers, ignorance of the terms and
their legal consequences become consent. If consumers do not read
the standard terms, they most certainly will not review them, even
For the common law; see ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND
THEORY 41 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business eds., 2011); for Spain, and the
civil law tradition generally; see LUIS MARIA DIEZ-PICAZO, FUNDAMENTOS
15

DEL DERECHO CIVIL PATRIMONIAL: INTRODUCCION TEORIA DEL CONTRATO

172 (Thomson Civitas et al. eds., 6th ed. 2007).
16

RESTATEMENT

OF THE LAW

CONSUMER CONTRACTS,

Reporters'

Introduction, 2 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 2019).

&

CARL SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED
&

17 OMRI BEN-SHAHAR

TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (Omri Ben-Shahar

Carl Schneider eds., 2014).
18 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are PayNow, Terms Later Contracts Worse
for Buyers: Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEG. STUD. 309
(2009); Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print?ConsumerAttentionto Standard-FormContracts,
43 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2014).
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provided with reasonable opportunity to do so, at least as long as
they are no explicitly related to the main characteristics of the good
they are acquiring. Therefore, as Eisenberg has said, under this
proposal a consumer would be bound to terms to which he has not
given knowledgeable and meaningful assent1 9, which is untenable.
And if we allow those terms to become part of the contract, we will
face a second problem as the incentives of the vendor will lead to
more complex and inscrutable standard terms, as has been proposed by professor Bar-Gill 20
The Reporters justify their choice in the fact that although
"the 'opportunity to read' technique, which courts have embraced,
is quite ineffective in consumer contracts (...) courts have -without exception- endorsed and enforced standard form contracts"".
Thus, the Draft Restatement attempts to give legal ground
to a situation that is actually the reality of consumer transactions.
The question is if it could be different. We are surrounded by
standard form contracts in almost every aspect of our life, and that
phenomenon is expanding, spurred by online commerce. Companies use standard form contracts to minimize or manage the risks
they are exposed to in case of breach, which allows them to place
a fixed value on every consumer transaction and to calculate precisely their liability exposure. They can discriminate between types
of consumers, limit their liability, gather consumer data, impose
arbitration clauses, choose the legal forum, among other examples
of practices that may lower their exposure to financial risks. Vendors know that most of their clients are not going to complain anyway, even in the presence of unfair terms. In some sense, the law
is being hypocritical, as it made an assumption that consumers will
read and understand the standard terms, knowing that they will
not.

Management of risks would become more difficult if a requirement of "knowledgeable and meaningful assent" is enforced
for every contract term in the context of massive contracting. It
could be argued that massive consumer transactions would become impracticable if we were to impose the whole contract theory
of assent upon them.

19

Eisenberg, supra note 4.

OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 24 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012).
21 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONSUMER CONTRACTS,
Reporters'
20

Introduction, 3 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 2019).
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A functioning global economy based on mass produced
goods needs standard form contracts. Also, the formula used by the
Draft Restatement could be deemed as reasonable: it gives consumers a proper opportunity to review and decide whether a term
is unacceptable; it also gives certainty to vendors, as once that window of opportunity is closed, the transaction is firm. It is consistent
with Llewellyn's teachings, and has its own means of expost judicial control if the term proposed by the drafter is "unexpected", in
the doctrine of unconscionability (stated in the Draft Restatement,
Section

§ 5). American law has a long-standing tradition of private

enforcement and class actions, so a significant level of confidence
in the judiciary as a means of proper control is reasonably justified.
However, if we follow this path to its end, it will become clear that
the edges of a consumer contract are not defined by assent, but rather for what we call the "reasonable expectations" of the consumer2 2 And what could a consumer reasonably expect from a con-

tract surely is a contested matter, but for the "core terms", e.g., the
acquired good and its price2 3
The comment on Section § 2 is consistent with this. It states
that consumers are well aware of some core aspects of the transaction but are unlikely to exercise "meaningful informed consent" on
the rest of the terms, and it also explicitly affirms that such rule
"seek to preserve the convenience of streamlined contracting"".
Nevertheless, as Radin explains, evading the issue of consent by
arguing that consumers "should" have or "would" have consented
to the standard terms, skirts the basic premise of contractual exchange, that a free decision is made to engage in an exchange beneficial to both parties 25
If we limit the idea of assent to the core deal, then there is
no "contract", regarding standard terms, at least according to traditional contract theory. Standard terms are a way to fill the gaps
of the parties' agreement, but they are neither the only one, not
necessarily the best one. Standard terms imposed by one of the parties are not an indication of freedom of contract but a faithful representation of the interests of just one of the parties. It is a private

22 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING

RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 83 (Princeton Univ. Press eds., 2013).
23 Rutgers, supra note 1, at 136.
24 RESTATEMENT

OF THE LAW

CONSUMER CONTRACTS,

Introduction, cmt. 1, § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 2019).
25 Radin, supra note 22, at 31.
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regulation of the terms of the contractual relationship that superseded the developments of private law in favor of the stronger
party. If we allowed that kind of private regulation, then the question moves to which are its limitations 26 The Reporters affirm that

"[t]he ex post scrutiny of permissible contracting, as well as the
scrutiny of standard contract terms (...) are not intended to be (nor
can they feasibly operate as) a replacement for private ordering.
Parties are allowed to design their transactions (...)". Nevertheless,
the drafting of standard terms allows only one of the parties -the
stronger one- to design their transactions. Consumers only endure those terms.
Section § 2 of the Draft Restatement implies that the only
limit for standard terms is the expost control by the judiciary, using the doctrine of unconscionability. The "blanket assent" by the
consumer would allow any form of private regulation, with exception of those deemed "unfair" according to that doctrine (and its
regulation in Section § 5, which has also been the subject of criticism27 ). However, a criteria that deemed unfair only the terms that
"alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms"
is an apparent limitation, because the bargained terms usually refer only to the core of the transaction, and many of the standard
terms that affect the rights of the consumer do not have a direct
effect in the price or the characteristics of the acquired good. Limitation of liability, arbitration clauses or use of personal data don't
have a direct relation to price, characteristics or specifications of
the good or to the extension of the vendor's warranty. In any case,
consumers are at the mercy of the amount of self-restrain exercised
by the company when drafting the standard terms 2s
Also, some studies have shown that consumers are not willing to go to court to challenge unfair terms 29 They feel responsible
for not reading the contract and bound to the terms that are part

W. David Slawson; see Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 566 (1971) (Slawson
proposed the idea that standard form contracts are a form of private regulation
or legislation); see also Radin, supra note 22, at 7.
27 Eisenberg, supra note 4.
28 Rutgers, supra note 1, at 141.; Florencia Marotta-Wurgler
& Robert
Taylor, Set in Stone: Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form
Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 261 (2013).
29 Rutgers, supra note 1, at 144.
26
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of the contract3 0 In addition, there is a significant gap in legal
knowledge that affects the consumer. Unfairness has a different
meaning for a layperson than for a lawyer, and that difference only
becomes more obscure with the language used in standard terms
contracts. Many consumers won't even know that the terms
"adopted" into the contract could be deemed unfair. In contrast to
European rules (see infra), the Draft Restatement does not require
standard terms to be in comprehensible language.
Finally, under Section § 2, the Draft Restatement grants the
consumer a single remedy, an opportunity to avoid or terminate
the transaction. Termination of the contract is an unbalanced remedy, as it protects the interest of the company of managing or diminishing its exposure to risk in that single transaction but leaves
the interest of the consumer unsatisfied. If a consumer opts to
avoid the contract (after reviewing its terms), her consent to the
core terms would be deemed moot, she should get what she wants
from another vendor (which may use the same terms she rejected
before), losing the time and effort put in the transaction. The termination solution, then, is as one-sided as the drafting of the standard terms in the first place, which will probably lead to indifference
by the consumer and strengthen her unwillingness to challenge any
unfair terms she may encountered.
A restatement has as purpose to be a "clear formulation of
common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflects
the law as presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a
court"3' However, this reconstruction of the law of consumer contracts is problematic. The notion of assent cannot be formulated in
isolation, disregarding the principles that inspire private law in

general, at least from a civil law tradition perspective.
Lawyers formed under the civil law tradition usually are
critical of the common law approach to contracts, based on the intractability of the notion of consideration and the role of bargain.
They also consider that the question of the binding nature of contractual obligations is a moot question, as the civil codes in their
respective countries usually solved that problem with a simple
rule: "All legally celebrated contract is a law for its parties and cannot be invalidated but for mutual assent or legal causes" (Chilean

30 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 141 (2017).
31 REVISED STYLE MANUAL (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
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Code, art. 1545)32 Therefore, in the civil law tradition, the binding
nature of contracts is the result of both the freedom of the individuals and its recognition by law" The private regulation by the parties is binding only and to the extent law recognizes it34
Private law, in general, is a body of rules and principles that
assumes certain fundamental principles that justifies its internal
structure35 : a formal equality between its subjects, where no one
could impose her will to the other; freedom of contract, as in autonomy to decide how to regulate her interactions with other private entities; and (fault based) liability 36 Those principles arguably
are related to the Aristotelian idea of corrective justice, an idea that
has been defended in the common law tradition by Weinrib3 7
These ideas were taken to an extreme during the nineteenth
century, with the development in Germany of the so called will
theory8 Under that doctrine, all contractual obligations were
based in the will of the subject. The will of the private party was
king and define the content and the limits of her obligations under
the law. No (contractual) obligation could be assumed without
prior consent and the law does not have a justification to intervene
in the regulation of private transactions because all parties were
equal and were able to defend their own interest. If someone sacrifices a right under a contract it is because is getting something that
she values more than what she was giving 39 Understated there is
the idea that these are bilateral transactions, where the characteristics of the parties are relevant to the design of the terms and conditions of the contract and are analyzed and valued by them.

32 The Chilean rule is quite similar to the old article 1134 of the French Civil
Code or Code Napoleon (now article 1194, after the 2016 reform).
3 WERNER

FLUME,

EL

NEGOCIO JURIDICO.

PARTE

GENERAL

DEL

DERECHO CIVIL. TOMo SEGUNDO 25 (Cuarta ed., Fundaci6n Cultural del
Notariado, 1998).
34 Id.
3 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (Harvard Univ. Press
1995).
36 Norbert Reich, Diverse Approaches to Consumer ProtectionPhilosophy,
14 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 257,265 (1992).
3 Curtis Bridgeman, CorrectiveJustice in ContractLaw: Is There a Case
for PunitiveDamages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237, 238 (2003); Weinrib, supra note
35, at 136.
38 Flume, supra note 33, at 78.
39 Radin, supra note 22, at 15.
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However, in opposition to the traditional view, consumer

contracts have a fundamentally different set of assumptions.
Transactions are massive; consumers are anonymous entities for
the vendor, all with the same characteristics; there is a structural
difference in bargaining power, sophistication and knowledge

about the object of the contract. There is a significant and unsurmountable asymmetry between the parties.
The Reporters recognize the fundamental difference between consumer contracts and contracts ruled by the general theory. They also recognize the defects of the solution proposed in Section § 2 for the doctrine of assent and its flawed premise of
consumer information, but resort to the notion that they are only
restating what has been invariably enforced by the courts regarding consumer contracts. Nevertheless, no notion of assent with a
problem of internal coherence will be able to sustain a proper understanding and adequate rules for the problems raised by consumer contracts. No enforcement by courts of an incoherent solution will change the fact that it is unreasonable to demand
rationality of irrational agents. The questions only get more difficult with the advance of online commerce and the proliferation of
standard terms that have only a tenuous relation with the core
deal, such as privacy and data gathering clauses, that sometimes
even the vendor itself does not even know the eventual consequences of their adoption in the contract.

I.

UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS IN THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION
A. European Union

A detailed analysis of the European legislation on unfair
contract terms exceeds the scope of this paper, but a summary of
its principles is useful to understand the main differences with the
Draft Restatement.

The European Union approach to the problem of standard
terms contracts has its foundations in German Law, in particular
the law on standard business conditions, AGBG-Gesetz of 1976,
replicated in the UK and France in the following years4 0 After
40 PAOLISA NEBBIA, UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS IN EUROPEAN LAW:

A

STUDY IN COMPARATIVE AND EC LAW 7 (Hart, Ser. Modern Studies in European Law, 2007).
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several years of proposals and discussions, Directive 93/13/EEC on
unfair consumer contracts (hereinafter, Unfair Contract Terms Directive or UCTD) was enacted, with a purpose of increasing consumer protection and promote and enhance cross-border transactions between member states 4 1The starting point of the regulation,
therefore, was private law, and in particular, contract theory. The
focal point of consumer regulations is the contract between vendor
and consumer, and the control of the validity of the contract (including standard terms) is expost.
UCTD refers mainly to standard (non-negotiated) terms
contracts between business and consumers, putting the defining
factor in the idea that the consumer is a person acting for purposes
outside her trade, business or profession. You are not a consumer,
you act like one42 This assumption determines that the consumer is
the weaker party in the relation, as the professional will have more
information and, arguably, a greater bargaining power vis-a-vis
the consumer4 3
The first level of protection of the (weak) consumer is the
unfairness test, as defined in Article 3 UCTD as "a contractual
term which has not been individually negotiated [that] (...), contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer". The unfairness test has a
similarity with the doctrine of unconscionability, but its require-

ment are less demanding for the consumer that the regulation of
Section §5 of the Draft Restatement. In addition to the test, the
UCTD contains an annex with an indicative list of contract terms

that maybe regarded as unfair.
Also, note that according to Article 4.2 UCTD, assessment
of the unfairness of a term cannot relate to the definition of the
subject of the contract or to adequacy of price. In other words, the
control of consumer contract terms cannot reach into the "core
terms" of the deal, which remain regulated by the traditional rules
of contract. Arguably, although, this notion of "core terms" starts

41

HANS MICKLITZ, UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES AND MISLEADING

ADVERTISING, EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW 133 (Norbert Reich et al. eds.,
2014).
NORBERT REICH, MERCADO Y DERECHO 175 (Ariel 1985).
& HANS MICKLITZ, ECONOMIC LAW, CONSUMER
INTEREST, AND EU INTEGRATION, EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW 6 (Norbert
42

43 NORBERT REICH

Reich et al. eds., 2014).
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with a more limited scope that the assumptions of the Draft Restatement.

In European law, the basic principle is that the consumer
must be able to know all contract terms before conclusion4 4 No
standard term could become a part of a contract if they are not
informed to the consumer prior to her decision to enter the contract, notwithstanding any ex post opportunity to review them.

Any term presented to the consumer after her assent should be
deemed as a proposal of modification of the contract and would
also be subject to the unfairness test45 Intellectual property introduces a higher level of complexity, in particular regarding software
contracts, but the European answer has been to postpone the moment of contract formation to when the consumer has notice of the
conditions for using the software 46
A second level of protection, known as the transparency
principle, is included in Article 5 UCTD, which states that "terms
must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there
is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favorable to the consumer shall prevail". According to the Court of
Justice of the European Union, "that consumer is in a position to
evaluate, on the basis of plain, intelligible criteria, the economic
consequences for him which derive from it 4",

a fairly demanding

requirement. There is some uncertainty regarding the legal effect
of a violation of the transparency principle, but the logical conclusion would be that it would render the term unfair48 The Draft Restatement does not have an analogue requirement to the transparency principle.

Another significant difference with the Draft Restatement
is remedies. The common remedy for an unfair term is to deem that
term not binding on the consumer but maintaining the validity of
the contract. Therefore, the European regulation does not put the
consumer in an all-or-nothing situation as the Draft Restatement,
44 MARTIN HOGG, COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW 67 (Larry A. Dimatteo

& Martin Hogg, eds., 2016).
45 Id at 66; Alces, supra note 11, at 39. (Note that Alces assumes that this is
the right solution in American law according to Section 2-207 of the U.C.C., in
opposition to Section § 2 of the Draft Restatement and the decision in ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)).
46 Id at 67.
47 Case C-96/14, Jean-Claude Van Hove v. CNP Assurances SA, 2015
E.C.R. (http://curia.europa.eu).
48 Rutgers, supra note 1, at 135.
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but impose a punishment to companies, that will see their riskavoiding clauses disappear.
The differences in the approach to consumer protection issues is also reflected in the manner in which the legal system enforce the rules regarding standard terms contracts. As said, the
Draft Restatement relies in the capacity of the judiciary to police
the agreements, under a private enforcement regime. The European regulation encourages the existence of a mix of ex ante and ex
post control.
In 2017, the European Commission published the Report
on the Fitness Check of consumer and marketing law and of the
evaluation of the Consumer Rights Directive, including the evaluation of the UCTD 49 The report concludes that the UCTD is considered to be effective, but that more stringent regulation may be
in order. A particular study regarding the UCTD concluded that
extending the scope of its rules to individually negotiated term
have increased consumer protection, and that some results regarding extension to price and definition of subject matter have also
proved beneficial when the product is not subject to market discipline50 In addition, a more vigorous ex officio enforcement by
courts and giving erga omnes effect to their decisions were proposed as means to reinforce consumer protections'
The transparency principle was also regarded as an important element of consumer protection, as legal language is a significant barrier for consumers to identify unfair terms 2 A behav-

ioral study conducted in 2016 showed that adjusting the way in
which standard terms are presented could increase the understanding of those terms, especially when summarized" However,
these results should be contrasted with the empirical research by

4 Publ'ns Office of the European Union, Study for the FitnessCheck ofEU
consumer and marketing law: final report. Part 1, main report (Jan. 8, 2017),
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f7b3 95 8b772b-11e7-b2f2-01aa75ed71al/language-en/format-PDF
files/89/source-5352 7225.html.
SO Id at 94.
S1

52

Id at 95.
Id

3 Eur. Comm'n,
Study on consumers' attitudes towards Terms and
Conditions (T&Cs) (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union,
2016).
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Wilkinson-Ryan regarding the willingness of consumers to challenge what they deemed as unfair terms54
B. Chile
Chile has a legal system belonging to the civil law tradition.
During the military dictatorship, several regulations were reformed to establish a neoliberal market system, with privatization
and deregulation as its main characteristics, in stark contrast to the
heavily regulated economy of decades prior.
Until the return of democracy in 1990, consumer protection
was not much more than an afterthought, an appendix to unfair
competition rules preventing fraud and misrepresentation, that
also forbid discrimination and refusal to deal. There was no regulation of standard terms, but for article 1566 of the Civil Code of
1855, which stated a contra proferentem interpretation rule which
has been regarded as ahead of its time: "If any of the preceding
interpretation rules cannot be applied (...) ambiguous terms
drafted or dictated by one of the parties (...) will be interpreted
against her, provided that ambiguity comes from the lack of explanation that should have given". Notwithstanding the existence of
this rule for more than a century, legal doctrine did not show much
interest in it"

The first proper regulation in this matter, the Protection of
Consumers' Rights Law (Ley de Proteccidnde los Derechosde los
Consumidores, Law N0 19496, hereinafter LPDC) was enacted in
1997 after six years of heated discussion in Congress 5 6 It is a regulation that firmly puts consumer protection in the realm of classic
private law. In other words, it considers the contract as the focal
point of consumer regulation and the main technique used are
mandated disclosures.
LPDC define standard contracts (contratos de adhesidn,
LPDC article 10 N0 6) as the ones which their terms are unilaterally
proposed by the vendor, with the consumer unable to alter their
" Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 30. The study concluded that evidence suggests that efforts to increase consumer access to standard terms inhibit substantive objections to those terms; see id at 172.
s JORGE LOPEZ SANTA MARIA

&

FABIAN ELORRIAGA DE BONIS, LOS

CONTRATOS: PARTE GENERAL 517 (2017).
s6 There were some prior rules that deal with consumer protection, all the

way back to 1932, however, the 1997 law was the first systematic attempt to
regulate the matter.
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content to enter into them. Since the 2004 reform, LPDC article 12
A states that regarding online contracts, the vendor must provide
clear, comprehensible and unequivocal access to the terms of the
contract prior to celebration, and the possibility to file it or print it.

Otherwise, no contract will be formed. Also, after assent, the vendor must send written confirmation to guarantee "due and timely"
information to the consumer. As the contract was already formed,
the requirement seems to facilitate either a future challenge of any
term deemed unfair by the consumer or the exercise of the right to
withdraw (available with some limitations for online contracts)"

Chilean law also recognizes a weak version of the transparency principle, mainly through formal means. LPDC article 17

states a minimum size for contract terms (2.5 mm), the use of Spanish language and "clear legibility" of the terms. Note that the law
does not require intelligibility of the terms, which reduces the effectiveness of the rule.
Regarding unfair contract terms, the original provisions of

the LPDC (articles 16 and 17) were inspired by European legislation, but at first, they were limited to a blacklist of just six kinds of
forbidden terms5 8 Those terms are regarded as null and void if included in any standard terms contract.
The 2004 reform added a general clause to article 16, very
similar to the unfairness clause of the UCTD, but with additional
qualifications: "Contrary to the requirement of good faith, considering objectives parameters, it causes a significant imbalance in the
parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the
detriment of the consumer. The ends of the contract and special
and general rules shall be attended for this purpose (...)". A reform
in 2012 added mandatory disclosures in standard term financial
contracts and regulated certain terms regarding tying and mortgages.

Control of the unfairness of standard terms is mainly made
ex post by the courts, through individual or class actions 9 The
main remedy is the declaration of nullity of the specific term, as
long as the contract can subsist without it. However, nullity under

* MARIA ELISA MORALES ORTiZ, CONTROL PREVENTIVO DE CLAUSULAS

ABUSIVAS 86 (2018).
58 The number is fairly small in a comparative context. The UCTD annex
contains 17 terms.
9 Individual actions are ruled by municipal judges. Class actions have a
special procedure and are decided by civil judges.
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the Chilean rules requires a judicial decision (before, the term is
binding for the consumer), so it would be wrong to state that unfair
clauses are not binding under the LPDC. Again, this goes against
the effectiveness of the rules. The 2012 reform added a voluntary
ex ante control of financial contracts by the consumer protection
agency (SERNAC), which has the power to grant an "approval
seal" of the fairness of the contract terms 60 However, up to this
date, no company has requested or obtained the seal.
The judicial control has been regarded as insufficient. An
empirical study in 2007 -ten years after its enactment- deemed the
system as a failure, for lack of consumer actions and contradictory
judicial decisions6 ' Moreover, the introduction of class actions in
2004 has not been able to solve the access to justice problem, as it
is still a fairly complex proceeding, the agency has a very limited
budget and consumers' associations have a precarious financing 2
Notwithstanding, there have been some significant decisions, although it is difficult to analyze their future impact, as enforcement
and possibility of sanction remains low.
In the last few years, with different emphasis, the SERNAC
has developed an administrative mediation process in order to directly negotiate the amendment of questionable terms with the
companies63, which received legal recognition in the 2018 reform.
As of 2020, the Chilean system of control of standard terms
is clearly lacking. Unfair terms are prevalent in several types of
common contracts and the system is unable to process the requirements of online commerce. Several standard contracts are celebrated with companies abroad, out of the reach of the Chilean
rules. Besides, the preventive system for financial contracts has
failed, the ex post control by the judiciary has a very small scope
and class actions remain in very low numbers 64
LPDC, art. 55.
Carlos Pizarro Wilson, El fracaso de un sistema: Anilisis empfrico y
dogmitico del control de cliusulas abusivas en contratos por adhesidn, 20(2)
60
61

REVISTA DE DERECHO (2007), 46-47.
62

See www.sernac.cl; www.pjud.cl. (In general, enforcement is weak. Ac-

cording to the SERNAC, they had received more than 265,000 complaints in
2016, but there were only 8,509 judicial actions).
63 Morales Ortiz, supra note 57,
at 96.
64 CONADECUS,
Demandas
Colectivas
presentadas
en
Chile,
https://www.conadecus.cl/content/uploads/2018/1 1/DEMANDASCOLECTIVAS-PRESENTADAS-EN-CHILE.pdf. (Until 2018, only 112 class
actions have been filed, 73 of them by SERNAC).
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In my opinion, a significant part of this disappointing re-

sults comes from the view that consumer protection is part of private law. The LPDC approach to standard contract is based on the
idea of freedom of contract and equality of the parties, with the
assumption that providing adequate information to the consumer
solves the information asymmetry. The only corrective is an unfairness test, similar to the one on Directive 93/13, but its effectiveness ends up limited by the lack of an efficient procedure. As per
the state of development of the Chilean judicial system and proceedings, a more active regulatory intervention in the content of
consumer contracts would be an improvement to the level of consumer protection.

III.A

REGULATORY APPROACH TO STANDARD TERMS IN

CONSUMER CONTRACTS
A. Beyond Assent
The assumptions of private law regulation of contracts require a bilateral transaction. The formal equality required by private law can only be ascertained between individuals.
Under private law, differences in patrimony, political ideas,

information or mental capacity are acceptable. We accept even opportunistic behavior in several cases. We could discuss if the Merchant of Rhodes dilemma was rightly solved, if we need a special
protection for weaker parties, such as unconscionability, undue influence or others, but we do not question the a priorivalidity of a
transaction between equals. If we are dealing with a transaction
between two companies or two individuals, or even a contract between a company and an individual, as long as there is something
distinctive regarding that particular transaction, that could be
characterized as a bilateral relationship, it will be governed by the
traditional rules of contract law. We assume that each of those parties can protect herself, so we have no justification for intervention,
but no contract could be invalidated on grounds of unfairness",
except in marginal cases (e.g., mistake, misrepresentation, undue

influence).

65 JACK BEATSON

& DANIEL

FRIEDMAN, GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN

CONTRACT LAW 8 (Daniel Friedman, ed. 1997).
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Massive and anonymous contracts are a very different
There is no bilateral transaction. For the company, a con-

sumer is just a number. She is not a person or even a proper "party"

in a bilateral contract. Any consumer transaction would be considered jointly with hundreds of others to determine the results of the
company in that particular line of business. The terms and conditions of the contracts, therefore, will not be drafted as per the characteristic of any of the bilateral relationships with a particular consumer, or for the characteristics of that consumer, but for the
aggregated results of those transactions 67
This fact represents a significant divergence of interests between the parties, as the conduct of the company is determined by
the guidance of its administration (usually, to achieve maximization of shareholders' value, which demands a rational conduct of
the administration). The contract, then, is celebrated between a
strictly rational, powerful party, and a person affected by her own
limitations. On the other hand, on the part of the consumer, there
is a diversity of interests involved in any given transaction, not lim-

ited to the pecuniary one, such as a desire for justice or a concern
for the environment 68 As Bar-Gill has stated, that asymmetry leads
companies to systematically attempt to take advantage of the cognitive bias of its consumers 69 The vendor knows (or should know)
that for the consumer would be irrational to read the terms in most
cases7 1 Contracts are a way to allocate risk between the parties, but
if only one of them is imposing the terms of the deal, that allocation
will not be an efficient one.
Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-ContractandShared
Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135, 1137, 1214 (2019) (they could be
deemed "pseudo-contracts").
66

67 Nicolas Rojas Covarrubias, zES EL CONSUMIDOR UN MAL PADRE DE
FAMILIA? ALCANCE DEL DEBER DE CUIDADO EXIGIBLE A LOS CONSUMIDORES,
ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO CIVIL X 426 (Alvaro Vidal et al. eds., 2015). (This is also

significant when we refer to liability in consumer transactions. Consumer law
prefers a strictly objective approach to liability that is usually not-fault based
(such as in product liability) and make no use of a standard of care. Although in
European law there are references to the "average consumer" and the "vulnerable consumer", in fact, liability is determined not by the standard of care placed
on the consumer (the caveat emptor approach), but by the results).
68 IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY:TEXT AND MATERIALS ON
REGULATING CONSUMER MARKETS 60 (3rd ed. 2012).

Bar-Gill, supra note 20, at 3.
7 Alces, supranote 11, at 53.
69
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In this context, the role of assent as foundation of contract,
at least, for this kind of contracts, should be reevaluated. Impossibility of meaningful assent regarding all contractual terms in
standard terms contracts demands a justification different than the
ones proposed under private law. Assent in these contracts is the
way to enter into a transaction that is wanted by the consumer (and
offered in bulk by the vendor) but does not justify for adoption of
terms drafted by only one of the parties or even ignored by the
other.
Even assuming a competitive market, a company designing

the terms of a contract that will be used in massive, anonymous
transactions will not be constrained or restrained by its interactions with its consumers, with the exception of the aspects of the
relationship subject to competitive pressure. However, most of the
standard terms are not a relevant competitive variable, as consumer do not read the terms, do not understand them or, when they
read them and understand them, think they will not apply to them
or that they are not assuming any risk, as per some cognitive bias"
Hardly any consumer decides between one product or another
based on the differences on standard terms offered by the vendor
or producer (with the exception of warranty terms). Usually, sophisticated consumers are not able to generate enough pressure to
change the company's incentives, as long the company has a way
to discriminate in favor of them. Also, consumer preference for a
product based on its intrinsic characteristics does not give its vendor a carte blanche to impose any term on its consumers. The different relative positions of consumer and companies in the market
affects the basis of private law, because we are not facing a bilateral relationship.
In addition, expost judicial control of standard terms only
forces companies to internalize a part of the costs of the unfair
terms, a function of the willingness of consumers to challenge
terms in courts and the possibility of sanction and its cost. Without

" Radin, supra note 22, at 106.; Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change

and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 485 (1974); Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts:
The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 447, 475
(2008). ("competitive conditions are essentially uncorrelated with the quality of
standard terms." This is consistent with the lack of competitive pressure regarding contract terms).
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punitive damages (the usual situation in civil law countries), the
level of prevention will be less than optimal 2
As said before, the problem becomes defining the limitations of private regulation of consumer transactions, in a way that
allows the companies to determine their exposure and manage
risks, in order to compete in the marketplace, but at the same time
providing adequate protection to consumers, in a context where

the usual private law explanation for giving freedom to private
parties will not work" The phenomenon of massive consumptions
put us on a regulatory framework, where we should decide the
public policy objectives of regulation of consumer contracts. In a
way, we should abandon the notion of "consumer law" and replacing it for "mass consumption law".

B. A Regulatory Toolbox to address Consumer Contracts
According to regulatory theory, we should use different
tools in order to get the public policy results that we seek. Regulation should be responsive to industry conduct to alter the incentives of the parties involved. The idea of responsiveness is that we
need to use a broad policy toolkit to address the challenges imposed
by consumer contracts and not limit ourselves to the solutions provided by private law7 4 Our objective should be the disappearance
of unfair terms, even in the case that implies a more intrusive regulation.
It is usually said in civil law countries that the difference
between private law and public law could be summarized in the
aphorism "in private law, you could do everything that it is not
forbidden by law; in public law, you could do only what it is allowed by law". In public law, one of the parties can impose its will
to the other, they are not formally equal. Because of that, that party
needs a justification to be able to do so: a special legal cause.

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, PunitiveDamages:An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 950, 954 (1998).
3 Reich, supra note 36, at 257. ("Consumer protection aspects have now
been introduced in so many areas of law that it is hard to find out where specific
consumer concerns begins and where traditional standards are merely extended").
72

4 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds.,

1992)
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It is possible to use the same framework to address the
problems observed in the consumer contracts setting. We need to
justify why we allow altering default rules of contract law in benefit of companies. This is not a new idea. In 1970, Jolowicz affirmed that "it is impossible for the contract between buyer and
seller, or for the rules of law which regard the consumer transaction as falling essentially within the law of contract, to produce a
satisfactory allocation of the risks involved (...) it is necessary (...)
that the law itself, not the contract between buyer and seller,
should regulate the allocation of risk between the parties 5". Radin
has argued that the reasoning behind standard contracts is straddling the limits between contract and tort76 Tort law deals with
involuntary transactions and, in one sense, standard terms are one.
The tort framework, however, seems limited as it is also a private
law solution that in order to respect the freedom of private parties
uses an ex post judicial control scheme.
A massive, anonymous contract requires the use of preventive tools that allocate risks between consumers and companies.
The solution proposed by the Draft Restatement falls short of that
objective, as relies only in the notion of assent and a minimal intervention in the content of the contract.
The regulatory literature focus on deterrence of bad conduct of companies, with escalating responses related to how serious
is the offense to determine the enforcement strategy (tit-for-tat enforcement). We need to have sticks big and small. This is consistent
with OECD recommendations regarding consumer policy77 Therefore, we should look at private law solutions as just one of the tools
at the disposal of the regulator and use them only when they are
appropriate to obtain a particular objective.

In the Chilean legal system, with its lack of access to the
judiciary, this could mean abandoning the traditional rules of nullity and qualify unfair terms as non-binding ab initio, expanding
the list of forbidden terms, and strengthen the transparency rules
and the capabilities of the administrative agency; in the EU, it
could mean granting erga omnes effects to judicial rulings or to intervene in negotiated terms, even price. A Restatement of Consumer Contracts should take all these developments into account
" J. A. Jolowicz, The Protectionof the Consumer and Purchaserof Goods
under English Law, 32 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1969).
76 Radin, supra note 22, at 208.
" OECD, CONSUMER POLICY TOOLKIT 13 (OECD Publishing, 2010).
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and be more open to recognize the limitations of a strict private
law approach to this matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Draft Restatement is a significant effort to clarify the
rules governing consumer contracts as stated by the United States
judiciary. It also puts in the spotlight the contradiction between
empirical and normative studies regarding the position of consumers and their capability to read and understand proposed standard
terms, and the interpretation of the rules of assent by the courts.
Moreover, the adoption by the Draft Restatement of a permissive
rule regarding terms communicated to the consumer after the
transaction seems to go further than what it is traditionally proposed in contract law or what it is accepted in the civil law tradition.

A coherent set of rules that could provide protection to consumers and flexibility to companies will not come from private law
or contract theory; it should embrace the differences between the
anonymous massive transactions that are the core of consumer
contracts and the bilateral relationships that are the subject of private law, even considering developments based on the principle of
good faith. Regulatory theory seems to be better suited for that purpose.
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